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Abstract. We consider  the  problem of  executing conscious behavior  i.e.,  of 
driving an agent’s actions and of allowing it, at the same time, to run concurrent 
processes  reflecting  on  these  actions.  Toward  this  end,  we  express  a  single 
agent’s plans as  reflexive dialogs in a multi-agent system defined by a virtual 
machine.  We  extend  this  machine’s  planning  language  by  introducing  two 
specific operators for reflexive dialogs i.e., conscious and caught for monitoring 
beliefs and actions, respectively. The possibility to use the same language both to 
drive a machine and to establish a reflexive communication within the machine 
itself stands as a key feature of our model.
1 Introduction
Intelligent behavior, presumably, is strongly related to the concept of consciousness. 
In order to achieve true machine intelligence, one ought therefore to address the issue 
of modeling and executing conscious behavior. In the absence of a commonly agreed 
meaning for this term, we use it here in a somehow restricted sense i.e., to refer to the 
goal  of  "driving  an  agent’s  actions  and  of  allowing  it,  at  the  same  time,  to  run 
concurrent processes reflecting on these actions". We shall therefore not attempt to 
model the truly reflexive concept of "conscious to be conscious", which would be 
required for instance to capture the concept of "consciousness of having beliefs".
When  compared  to  classical  AI  problems,  such  as  automatic  planning  and/or 
reasoning,  the amount of  research devoted so far  to  this subject  is  rather  limited. 
Surprisingly, we could hardly find more than a few references pertaining to recent 
work done in this area [5] [8] [15]. Provided that consciousness essentially functions 
as a mirror, the lack of formal models for the intelligence itself suggests that models 
of conscious behavior could not have anything to reflect upon. Furthermore, as this 
reflection  seems  to  rely  on  internal  linguistic  representations  relating  beliefs  and 
mental  attitudes  [6]  [7],  the  lack  of  adequate  formal  languages  for  this  purpose 
indicates why conscious behavior cannot be easily reproduced.
Comprehensive  agent models,  if  available,  could  however  well  replace 
disembodied intelligence theories as the basis for modeling conscious behavior. More 
precisely, we envision that any system capable of mechanizing an agent’s behavior 
could be first extended to reflect its selection of actions i.e., to somehow notify the 
agent of its choices. The language used by the system itself to plan actions should 
then  be  extended  to  use  in  turn  these  internal  notifications.  For  an  agent  to  be 
conscious would then simply mean being able to recognize and acknowledge internal 
notifications at will. This overall process could be iterated to represent the concept of 
“conscious to be conscious”, and so on. Consciousness, taken as a whole, could thus 
be  considered  as  the  resulting  "closure  relation".  As  already  indicated,  we  shall 
however refrain ourselves from exploring this concept, and be content with a possible 
implementation of the first iteration only.
Our  recent  proposal,  that  introduces  formal  communication primitives  within  a 
multi-agent system [3] and defines a language for agent dialogs [4], is an example of 
an agent model that can be used for this purpose. In this approach, consciousness will 
primarily function as a monitor of actions and beliefs (in the weak sense of the word 
and not in Hoare’s strict sense) that allows for the triggering of new actions. As such, 
this concept of consciousness is truly reminiscent of previously introduced artifacts, 
such as demons1. Our basic idea that departs from these earlier attempts is as follows: 
in order to catch internal notifications, any conscious agent will engage in  multiple 
ongoing  conversations  with  itself.  The  way  for  an  agent  to  engage  in  multiple 
conversations  with  other  agents  have  already  been  discussed  in  [4],  and  will  be 
reviewed  below.  As  a  result,  each  communicating  agent  will  be  considered  as  a 
multithreaded  entity  interleaving  concurrent  conversations.  The  introduction  of 
reflexive dialogs (in a non-traditional  sense i.e.,  of having a dialog “with oneself” 
instead of "about itself") then simply requires an extension of their synchronization 
processes. From there, any agent’s plan will be represented as a reflexive dialog. 
This model, which will be thoroughly developed in this paper, definitively reflects 
a  "static"  capability  i.e.,  that  of  being conscious of  explicit  beliefs  and of  actions 
performed in full awareness. Different approaches might be possible. As an example, 
Baars [1] develops a concept of consciousness very much akin to a form of discovery 
and learning i.e., the "dynamic"  process of getting conscious of facts resulting from 
myriads of sensations. We shall further relate these two approaches in our conclusion.
Let us further point out here the differential aspects pertaining to the consciousness 
of  beliefs,  on  one  hand,  and  of  actions,  on  the  other.  As  an  agent’s  beliefs  are 
considered part of his local state, they can be represented by logical formulas that are 
stored in his memory. The consciousness of an agent’s beliefs is therefore persistent 
i.e., can be solicited at any time.  In contrast, any action that he chooses to perform 
either have an effect on the environment or lead to an updating of his local state, and 
usually has no direct trace in his memory (unless, of course, it gives rise to an ad hoc 
new belief, as will be shown at the end of this paper). As such the consciousness of an 
agent’s actions is volatile i.e., must be caught “on the fly” when these actions occur. 
The differentiation just made will lead us to the definition of two distinct operators 
i.e., conscious and caught for monitoring beliefs and actions, respectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we review previously 
published material in order to provide the reader with a basic understanding of our 
concept of agents dialog and its associated virtual machine. Section 3 shows how to 
represent  any  single  agent’s  plans  as  a  reflexive  dialog.  Section  4  proposes  the 
language extension allowing for the agent to reflect on his actions. Finally section 5 
introduces the virtual machine extensions needed to notify an agent of his actions.
1  « a procedure that watches for some condition to become true and then activates an associated 
process »[14] 
2   A model of social agents with reactive and proactive capabilities
In this section, we review the agent model introduced in [3] [4].
2.1   A language for agent dialogs 
In order to get, first,  an intuitive feeling for the language introduced in [4], let us 
consider the solution of the two-agent meeting-scheduling problem presented in [11]. 
In this problem, one agent is designated as the host and the other one as the invitee. 
Both agents have free time slots to meet e.g., if li refers to agent's i local state
lhost    meet(13) ∧ meet(15) ∧ meet(17) 
linvitee  meet(14) ∧ meet(16) ∧ meet(17) 
and they must find their earliest common slot (in this case,  17). We use a predicate 
epmeet(T1,T) meaning “T1 is the earliest possible meeting time after T”, defined as  
∀T1∀T∀T′ ( meet(T1)∧(T1>=T)∧¬(meet(T′)∧(T′ >=T)∧(T′ <T1))  ⇒  epmeet(T1,T))
The solution involves successive negotiation cycles. The host has the responsibility 
of starting each cycle with a given lower time bound T. A cycle comprises three steps, 
each step involving an exchange of messages.  In the first step, the host initializes a 
call/return exchange calling on the invitee to find out his earliest meeting slot T1 after 
T. In the second step, roles are swapped: the invitee initializes a call/return calling on 
the host to find out his earliest meeting slot  T2 after  T1. In the third step, the host 
either  confirms  an  agreement  on  time  T2 (if  T1=T2)  by  initializing  a  tell/ask 
exchange, or starts a new cycle with T2 as his new lower bound.
This solution can be informally expressed as follows:
“start with a call/return exchange, 
  proceed with a return/call exchange, 
  conclude with a tell/ask exchange and save the meeting time or resume”
The corresponding, implicitly synchronized dialogs are then 
dialog(invite(Invitee, T), [T1,T2],
[call(Invitee,epmeet(T1,T)),
 return(Invitee,epmeet(T2,T1)),
 ((T1=T2 | [tell(Invitee,confirm(T2)),
           execute(save(meeting(T2)))]);
  (T1\=T2| [resume(invite(Invitee,T2))]))])
dialog(reply(Host),         [T,T1,T2],
        [return(Host,epmeet(T1,T)),
         call(Host,epmeet(T2,T1)),
         ((T1=T2 | [ask(Host,confirm(T2)),
            execute(save(meeting(T2)))]);
          (T1\=T2| [resume(reply(Host))]))])
where  “,”  and  “;”  are  sequence  (or  conjunctive)  and  alternative  (or  disjunctive) 
operators, respectively. Variables start with capital letters, and variables that are local 
to a dialog are listed before the messages.  As it can be seen in this example, each 
dialog  consists  of  a  branching sequence of  messages  i.e.,  a  sequence with  an  end 
alternative containing  guarded messages. Similarly to lists, branching sequences can 
have  an  embedded  structure.  Unless  they  are  resumed (with  a  resume  message), 
dialogs are exited at the end of each embedded branching sequence (e.g. the above 
example,  after  the  execute messages).  Actions  interleaved  with  messages  can  be 
executed  with  an  execute message.  Sub-dialogues  can  be  entered  with  an  enter 
message,  similarly  to ordinary  procedures  (for  an example,  see section  2.4).   The 
corresponding BNF syntax is given below in Fig. 1 
<dialog>  ::=  dialog(<dialogName>(<dialogParams>),<varList>,<branchSeq>)
<varList>  ::=   [] || [<varName>|<varList>]
<branchSeq>   ::=   [] || [<alt>] || <seq> 
<alt>  ::=  <guardMes> || (<guardMes>;<alt>)
<seq>  ::=  [<mes>|<branchSeq>]
<guardMes>  ::=  (<guard>|<branchSeq>) 
<mes>  ::=  <messageName>(<messageParams>)
<messageName>   ::=   ask || tell || call || return ||  execute || enter || resume 
Fig. 1. BNF productions
As usual, “|” separates the head and tail of a list i.e.,  [m1|[m2|…[]]]=[m1,m2,…]. 
We also use “|” to isolate the guard in a guarded message. To avoid confusion, we use 
“||” as metasymbol for representing choices. We leave out the definitions for names, 
parameters, and guards,  these being identifiers, first  order  terms and expressions, 
respectively.  Branching  sequences  permit  end  alternatives,  but  do  not  allow  for 
starting  or  middle  alternatives  i.e.,  cannot  contain  the  list  pattern  [<alt>|
<branchSeq>]. 
2.2   A virtual machine for executing dialogs
As  thoroughly  developed  in  [4],  the  language  introduced  in  section  2.1  can  be 
compiled and executed on a virtual machine. This compilation amounts to rewriting 
each dialog into a non-deterministic plan (see below), and at the same time generates 
the  necessary  conditions  to  ensure  its  sequential  execution.  The  abstract  machine 
itself defines the run of a class of agents as a loop interleaving individual agent run 
cycles. It is given by the following procedure
procedure runClass(e,l)
loop
       for all  i such that  lClass  agent(i) do
            sense(li,e);
            if li   plan(p0i) 
            then reacti(e,l,p0i );
            if l Class   priority(n0) 
            then processClass(e,l,n0)
where e represents the state of the environment, l the local state of a class of agents 
defined by a vector l = [lClass,l1…ln], and the components lClass and li are the local state 
of the class and its members identified by an integer i=1…n, respectively. We assume 
that predicate agent is such that lClass agent(i)  whenever agent i belongs to the class. 
The language defining each  li includes a set  P of non-deterministic plan names (nd-
plan in short) and four predicates plan,  priority,  do and switch. For each agent i,  its 
current nd-plan   pi ∈ P refers to a set of implications  “conditions” ⇒  do(pi, a) or 
“conditions” ⇒  switch(pi, pi'), where a is an action (for an example, see section 2.4). 
Similarly  to  plans,  processes of  explicit  priority  n  encompass  implications 
“conditions” ⇒ do(n, a). We further assume that each agent’s initial nd-plan p0i and 
the class highest priority n0 can be deduced from l  i.e., that   li  plan(p0i) and lClass  
priority(n0),  respectively. 
In  each  run cycle,  initial  plans  p0i are  activated  by  a  procedure  reacti. 
Synchronization of message pairs occurs globally through a procedure  processClass. 
These procedures are defined as:
procedure reacti(e,l,pi)
if    li  do(pi, a)
then (e,l)  ←  τi(e,l,a)
else  if  li  switch(pi, pi') 
        then reacti(e,l,pi′)
procedure processClass(e,l,n)
if    l Class  do(n, a)
then (e,l) ←  τClass(e,l,a);
         processClass(e,l,n)
else  if  n >0 
        then processClass(e,l,n-1)
In  these  procedures,  the  state  transformer  functions   τi   and  τClass are  used  to 
interpret  actions and synchronize operations, respectively. As their names imply, nd-
plans are not executed sequentially. At each run cycle, procedure reacti will be called 
with the (possibly variable) initial plan p0i deduced for each agent. In each recursive 
reacti call, the agent’s first priority is to deduce and carry out an  action  a from its 
current plan pi. Otherwise, it may switch from pi to pi'. If the switch predicate defines 
decision trees rooted at  each  p0i,  then  reacti will  go down this decision tree.  This 
mechanism allows an agent to adopt a new plan whenever a certain condition occurs, 
and then to react with an appropriate action. As a result, actions will be chosen one at 
a time. In contrast to nd-plans, dialogs must be executed sequentially. Towards this 
end,  the  rewriting  of  dialogs  into  nd-plans  generates  implications  of  the  form 
“conditions” ⇒  do(pi, a) only. In other words, there will be no  switching of plans, 
and the state transformer function τ  associated with the message enter (for entering 
sub-dialogs) will  use instead a stack to reflect the dynamic embedding of dialogs. 
The conditions in each implication include both a synchronization and a sequencing 
condition  (for  further  details,  see  [4]),  and  the  action  a  always  incorporate  a 
predefined message together with some updating operations related to the conditions. 
As a result, a sequential execution of dialogs will be emulated, though actually each 
action will still be deduced one at the time using the mechanism defined for nd-plans. 
As for procedure processClass, it will execute, in descending order of priorities, all 
processes whose conditions are satisfied.  Processes will be used for the purpose of 
synchronizing message pairs. Synchronization occurs when the two messages forming 
a pair (i.e., tell(r,ϕ)/ask(s,ψ) or call(r,ϕ)/return (s,ψ) issued by sender  s and receiver 
r)  are acknowledged. It is triggered by two processes defined as 
    ack(s,tell(r,ϕ))  ∧  ack(r,ask(s,ψ)))      ⇒   do(2, tellAsk(s,r,ϕ,ψ))
    ack(s,call(r,ϕ)) ∧  ack(r,return(s,ψ))   ⇒   do(1, callReturn(s,r,ϕ,ψ))
where the acknowledgment flag  ack(i,message) is raised in  lClass when the  message 
issued by agent i is interpreted using function τi (for further details, see [3]). Similarly 
to actions, the synchronizing operations tellAsk and callReturn are interpreted by state 
transformer functions τClass that uses lClass as a blackboard.
2.3   Engaging in multiple conversations
Agents should be allowed to engage in multiple conversations. A possible solution is 
to define a parallel operator that can be used at the message level i.e.,  to interleave 
possible concurrent messages [10] [11]. We favor the simpler  solution whereby each 
agent  is  a  multi-threaded  entity  interleaving  concurrent  conversations.  In  this 
extended model, dialogs are now syntactic entities that, once compiled into plans,  can 
be associated with multiple conversations implemented as concurrent threads. Just as 
our multi-agent system was implemented as a multi-threaded entity of agents using 
predicate  agent, our multi-threaded agent will  be implemented as a multi-threaded 
entity of conversations using an additional predicate conversation as follows
procedure runClass(e,l)
loop
       for all  i such that  lClass  agent(i) do
            sense(li,e);
            for all  j  such that  li  conversation(j) do
                  if li   plan(p0ij) 
                      then reacti(e,l,p0ij );
                 if l Class   priority(n0) 
                 then processClass(e,l,n0)
where li  conversation(j)  means “conversation thread j is attached to agent i ” and 
p0ij is  the initial  compiled plan associated with  thread  j of  agent  i.  An additional 
primitive  message  concurrent can  then  be  used  in  any  dialog  to  create  a  new 
conversation thread when required (for an example, see the end of section 2.4). The 
synchronization processes must be redefined accordingly as follows
    ack(sj,tell(r,ϕ))  ∧  ack(rk,ask(s,ψ)))      ⇒   do(2, tellAsk(sj,rk,ϕ,ψ))
    ack(sj,call(r,ϕ)) ∧  ack(rk,return(s,ψ))   ⇒   do(1, callReturn(sj,rk,ϕ,ψ))
where the acknowledgment flag ack(ij, message) is raised when the message issued by 
conversation thread  j of agent i  is interpreted. Note that messages are still addressed 
to a given agent rather than to a specific thread of that agent.
As dialogs can include execute messages that allow in turn for the execution of any 
action, the language just reviewed constitutes a general model of social agents with 
sensing, reactive and proactive capabilities [16] (this latter capability deriving from 
the deduction of variable initial  plans p0i).  Its "operational semantics" is defined by 
the virtual machine together with the compiling functions contained in [4]. 
2.4   Example: a vacuum cleaner robot
To illustrate the concepts just reviewed, let us consider a vacuum cleaner robot that 
can choose either to work i.e., move and suck any dirt on sight, or to go back home and 
wait. Let us further assume that the robot must stop whenever an alarm condition is 
raised. These three behaviors  correspond to three possible nd-plans, i.e. work, home, 
and pause. The robot's overall behavior can be represented by a decision tree rooted at 
a single  initial plan and defined by the following implications, where the predicate 
in(X,Y)  and   dirt(X,Y)  are used to mean "the agent is located at (x,y)"  and "there is 
dirt at (x,y)", respectively, and the action stop, move, back, and suck have the obvious 
corresponding meaning:
     alarm ⇒  switch(initial,pause)
 ¬alarm ⇒  switch(initial,start)
    true ⇒  do(pause,stop)
    dirt(_,_) ⇒  switch(start,work)
 ¬dirt(_,_) ⇒  switch(start,home)
    in(X,Y)∧   dirt(X,Y) ⇒  do(work,suck(X,Y))
    in(X,Y)∧ ¬dirt(X,Y) ⇒  do(work,move(X,Y))
    in(X,Y)  ⇒  do(home,back(X,Y))
These implications can be directly interpreted on  the virtual machine of section 2.2. 
Each run cycle will be initiated with the single initial plan and then go down the 
decision tree.  Each action will  be  deduced  “just  on time”,   thus  ensuring a  truly 
reactive behavior. Equivalently, this robot can be specified by the following dialogs 
(that, at this point, do  not  involve any communication):
 dialog(initial, [], 
[((alarm         | [enter(pause)]);
  (not alarm   | [enter(start)]))])
 dialog(pause, [],
[execute(stop)])  
 dialog(start, [],
[((dirt(_,_)        | [enter(work)]);
  (not dirt(_,_)  | [enter(home)]))])
 dialog(work, [X,Y],
[((in(X,Y),dirt(X,Y) | [execute(suck(X,Y)),
   resume(initial)]);
 (in(X,Y),not dirt(X,Y) | [execute(move(X,Y)),
   resume(initial)]))])
 dialog(home, [X,Y],
[((in(X,Y) | [execute(back(X,Y)),
        resume(initial)]))])
The rewriting of dialogs into nd-plans generate conditions that will ensure their 
sequential execution, similarly to that of ordinary procedures (e.g., after entering start 
from initial, the control will be transferred to either work or home, and so on). Unless 
explicitly  directed to resume at  some point,  dialogs are exited at  the  end of each 
embedded  branching  sequence,  and  the  dialog  that  was  left  on  entering  is  then 
resumed by default.  In the above example, the  initial dialog is explicitly resumed 
after  the  execution  of  each  action,  thus  enforcing  the  same  reactive  behavior  as 
before.
As it can be seen in the above examples, the conditions in the implications defining 
nd-plans are identical to the guards in the guarded messages of the corresponding 
dialog. Furthermore, the do and switch predicates are used for the same purpose as the 
execute and  enter  messages, respectively. Intuitively then, a non-deterministic plan 
can thus be represented by a non-communicating dialog. Reversibly, any dialog can 
be compiled back into a nd-plan that do not contain any switch predicate.  As already 
indicated,  this  arises  because  the  state  transformer   functions  for  interpreting 
messages uses a stack to reflect the dynamic embedding of dialogs resulting from 
successive enter messages.
As a first step towards allowing an agent to reflect on his behavior, let us now try 
and express possible parallel  tasks in dialogs. Recalling from the end of section 2.2 
the  possibility  for  a  dialog   to  create  concurrent conversation  threads,  our  robot 
behavior can be further represented by the following dialogs 
 dialog(initial, [], 
[concurrent(pause),
[concurrent(start)])
 dialog(pause, [],
[((alarm | [execute(stop)]))]) 
 dialog(start, [],
[((not alarm | [concurrent(work),
        concurrent(home)]))])
 dialog(work, [X,Y],
[((dirt(_,_),in(X,Y),dirt(X,Y) | [execute(suck(X,Y)),
   resume(work)]);
  (dirt(_,_),in(X,Y),not dirt(X,Y) | [execute(move(X,Y)),
   resume(work)]))]) 
 dialog(home, [X,Y],
[((not dirt(_,_),in(X,Y) | [execute(back(X,Y)),
   resume(home)]))])
where concurrent guards are pushed one level “below” (i.e., the guards of concurrent 
conversation threads are checked on entry in these threads). Dialogs work and  home 
can now resume  themselves, as they are now concurrent together  with dialog  pause 
waiting for an eventual alarm. Let us further note that these two dialogs actually must 
resume  themselves:  if  the  initial  dialog  were  to  be  resumed  instead,  as  in  the 
preceding example, superfluous new concurrent threads would then be created.
Before proceeding, it is noteworthy to point out here  the role of guards in guarded 
messages. If a guard does not get satisfied (e.g., as in the case of  the pause dialog, 
when no alarm has been received yet), the associated message is not sent.  If there are 
no other alternatives, the dialog gets simply suspended until the guard gets satisfied. 
The guarded message as a whole thus acts as a  monitor or  demon i.e.,  it will stand 
alive, watch and wait until its associated message can eventually be sent.
3   Representing agent plans as reflexive dialogs
According to their intuitive meaning (and as defined by their compiling functions in 
which guarded messages are rewritten into implications), guards are required to be 
deductible from the agent local state. Let us now recall our introductory discussion 
about the  persistence of beliefs v/s the  volatility of action consciousness.  We thus 
have  to  conclude  that,  in  contrast  to  the  monitoring  of  beliefs  illustrated  in  the 
preceding example, guarded commands cannot be used to monitor actions. Looking 
for an alternative and general solution that will apply to both cases, our basic idea is 
to try and catch internal notifications by allowing any agent to engage in  multiple 
conversations  with  itself.  Towards  this  end,  we  first  need  to  be  able  to  process 
reflexive dialogs (in a non-traditional sense of the word i.e., a dialog "with oneself"). 
An ad hoc extension of the synchronization processes presented in section 2.2 simply 
requires two additional synchronization processes, defined as follows:
    ack(sj,tell(k,ϕ))  ∧  ack(sk,ask(j,ψ)))      ⇒   do(2, tellAsk(sj,sk,ϕ,ψ))
    ack(sj,call(k,ϕ)) ∧  ack(sk,return(j,ψ))   ⇒   do(1, callReturn(sj,sk,ϕ,ψ))
where the sender and the receiver are the threads j and k attached to agent s. Reflexive 
messages are thus sent by and addressed to specific threads of a given agent.
To illustrate this, let us now define a generic dialog conscience as follows:
dialog(conscience(P), [Thread], 
[((P       | [return(Thread,P)]))])
Suppose that this dialog has been attached to a given agent, and receives the message 
call(conscience(P),P) sent by a concurrent conversation (named  Thread) attached to 
the same agent. This dialog will then either return the belief P and exit, if this belief 
holds in the agent’s local state, or wait, in the contrary case. Let us further consider a 
new message conscious that can be macro expanded as follows 
conscious(P)  ==>   (concurrent(conscience(P)), call(conscience(P),P))
This message will  first create a conscience thread and then work as described above 
i.e.,  like a monitor  for beliefs that  will  stand  alive,  watch and wait  until  expected 
beliefs are effective.  If  we assume that  reflexive dialogs are precompiled to macro 
expand conscious messages and to include the generic dialog conscience, then our last 
example of section 2.4 can be rewritten as follows:
 reflexive(initial, [], 
[concurrent(pause),
 concurrent(start)])
 reflexive(pause, [],
[conscious(alarm),
 execute(stop)]) 
 reflexive(start, [],
[conscious(not alarm),
 concurrent(work),
 concurrent(home)])
 reflexive(work, [X,Y],
[conscious(dirt(_,_)),
 conscious(in(X,Y)),
 ((dirt(X,Y) | [execute(suck(X,Y)),
   resume(work)]);
  (not dirt(X,Y) | [execute(move(X,Y)),
   resume(work)]))])
 reflexive(home, [X,Y,]
[conscious(not dirt(_,_)),
 conscious(in(X,Y)),
 execute(back(X,Y)),
 resume(home)])
Let us stress here that this solution leads to the same behavior as before. In other 
words, in this example, the monitoring of individual beliefs using reflexive dialogs 
instead of guarded messages does not bring anything new. The explicit modeling of 
conscience  threads  does  however  open  the  door  to  more  complex  consciousness 
models relying on mental attitudes e.g., could lead to model such things as a troubled, 
selective or biased conscience. A similar scheme,  introduced in the next section, will 
allow  for the monitoring of actions.
The  verification  of  dialog  protocols  expressed  as  concurrent  reentrant  threads 
guarded with conscious monitors could be quite an intricate task. In order to prevent 
concurrent threads to get “stuck”, their monitors should not get bound by external 
variables. In the above example, the monitors of concurrent threads  work and  home 
get bound by local variables  X and  Y. In contrast, actions  suck(X,Y)  and  move(X,Y) 
cannot be expressed as concurrent reentrant threads because their monitor would be 
bound by external variables X and Y.
4   Executing conscious behavior by reflecting on one’s own actions
As alluded to in our introductory discussion,  the consciousness of an agent’s actions 
is volatile i.e., must be caught “on the fly”  when these actions actually occur. What 
we need to implement now is a  mechanism  whereby an agent will first be notified 
of, and then reflect on each of its actions individually. Once again, our language for 
agent dialogs will be used for this purpose.  In contrast to the consciousness of an 
agent’s beliefs, the sender of the notifications cannot be the agent itself, who will be 
solely  the  receiver,  and  the  notifications  will  be  sent  by  the  underlying  virtual 
machine.  Towards this end, let us define a generic dialog reflect as follows
dialog(reflect(P), [Thread], 
                            [ask(react,P),
                             tell(Thread,P)])
As before, suppose that this dialog has been attached to a  given agent and receives 
the message ask(reflect(P),P) sent by a concurrent thread attached to the same agent. 
This  dialog  will  first  send  the  message  ask(react,P)  to  a  pseudo  thread react 
representing the machine itself (or, more precisely, the react procedure of an extended 
virtual  machine,  as  it  will  be  explained  in the  next  section)  and then wait  for  an 
answer.  Upon receiving  a notification,  it  will  in turn answer  the asking  thread  by 
sending the message tell(Thread,P). Let us further consider a new message caught that 
can be macro expanded as follows 
caught(P)  ==> (concurrent(reflect(P)), ask(reflect(P),P))
This message will  first create a reflect thread and then work as described above i.e., 
will  monitor  the  notification  of  actions.  If  we  assume  that  reflexive  dialogs  are 
precompiled to macro expand caught messages and to include the dialog reflect, then 
any  behavior  could  be  directed to  reflect  on his  own actions,  using  a  concurrent 
reflexive dialog introspect saving ad hoc new beliefs done(P)  as follows:
reflexive(initial, [], 
[concurrent(“any behavior”),
                             concurrent(introspect)])
reflexive (introspect,  [P],
       [caught(execute(P)),
        execute(save(done(P))),
         resume(introspect)])
reflexive (“any behavior”,  [P],
               [ …
                conscious(done(P)),
                  … ])
The monitoring  of  actions  just  presented represents  a  first  step towards  modeling 
conscious behavior. As illustrated by the introspect thread, any number of concurrent 
threads could similarly be designed to reflect  in various ways on the execution of 
actions. For example, the ad hoc new beliefs done(P) created by the introspect thread 
could be monitored in turn to relate the consciousness of  previous actions to that of 
the current action, and so on.
5   An extended virtual machine for sending notifications
In order to complete the model, the virtual machine presented in section 2.2 must be 
extended to send internal notifications, when required. This extended virtual machine 
can be defined as follows:
procedure runClass(e,l)
loop
      for all  i such that  lClass  agent(i) do
            sense(li,e);
            for all  j  such that  li  conversation(j) and j≠ reflect(_) do
                  if li   plan(p0ij) 
                      then reacti(e,l,p0ij );
                              reflecti(e,l);
                         if l Class   priority(n0) 
                         then processClass(e,l,n0)
In  order  to  avoid  infinite  recursion,  this  machine  is  prevented  from  sending 
notifications about notifications (in other words, the consciousness is  not iterated to 
represent the concept of “being conscious to be conscious”, and so on). The  reflect  
threads are thus not interleaved with other threads, but are executed separately in each 
cycle using procedure reflecti(e,l). This procedure is defined in turn as follows:
procedure reflecti(e,l)
if   li  conversation(reflect(r))
     and  li  do(reflect(r), a)
then (e,l)  ←  τi(e,l,a);
         reflecti(e,l)
As a result of the end recursive call reflecti(e,l), all ready messages of all concurrent 
reflect threads attached to agent i will be sent without delay.  The actual notification 
takes place within an extended procedure reacti(e,l,pij) defined as follows:
procedure reacti(e,l,pij)
if    lj  do(pij, a)
then (e,l)  ←  τi(e,l,a);
        if  li  conversation(reflect(r))
            and a= (save(_,_),save(_,_),r)
        then ack(ireact,tell(reflect(r),r)  ←  true
else  if  li  switch(pij, pij') 
             then reactij(e,l,pij')
Any  action  a resulting  from  the  compilation  of  dialogs  has  the  form  of  a  triplet 
a=(save(_,_),save(_,_),r), where  r is one of the predefined message. After executing 
an action a, this extended procedure will check if the message r just processed can be 
matched  with  a  reflect(r)   thread  attached  to  agent  i.   If  so,  it  will  raise  an 
acknowledgment   flag   ack(ireact,tell(reflect(r),r))  that  in  turn  will  be  paired  for 
synchronization  with  the  acknowledgement  flag   ack(ireflect(r),ask(react,r)) raised  by 
message ask(react,r) from thread reflect(r). As the thread react actually does not exist, 
this amounts to emulating communication between the machine and  the agent i.
    This overall process can be represented by the following picture that elaborates on 
the abstract, top-level view of an agent as given in Wooldridge’s reference paper [16]:
Agent i
sense
Environment
Conversation jm
plan react do
plan react do
Conversation jn
Conversation reflect
do reflect
state
Fig. 2.
6   Related and further work
Previous  proposals  for  representing  consciousness  either  lack  an  explicit  formal 
model  [8]  [9],  functional  specifications  towards a possible implementation [5],  or 
both  [15].  Using  the  same  language  to  drive  a  machine  and  to  reflexively 
communicate within the machine itself stands as a key feature of our own model. As 
consciousness basically works as a mirror, we view this duality to be an essential 
characteristics. 
As already pointed out in the introduction, our model definitively reflects a "static" 
capability i.e., that of being conscious of explicit beliefs and of actions performed in 
full awareness. Baars [1] develops a concept of consciousness very much akin to a 
"dynamic" process of discovery and learning i.e., that of getting conscious  of implicit 
facts  resulting  from sensations.  Intuitively,  Baars  sees  the  human  brain  as  being 
populated by myriads of parallel unconscious processors that compete for access into 
a global workspace. This workspace functions as a serial channel of limited capacity 
that can broadcast information to the unconscious processors.  In various (possibly 
embedded) contexts,  unconscious processors may form coalitions that will then force 
their way into the global workspace. Baars’ theory is only described in general terms, 
and captured graphically in sets of diagrams of the type given below:
Consciousness
Contexts
Unconscious specialized processes
Process coalition
Broadcast
Fig. 3.
Although Baars  himself  once  wrote ”we now have a  number of  computational 
formalisms that can be used to make the current theory more explicit and testable”, 
we do not know of any attempt to develop the corresponding formalization.  These 
ideas  however  have  already  found  their  way  into  practical  applications  [8]. 
Unfortunately,  as  in  many  other  artificial  intelligence  models,  the  “theory  is  the 
program” i.e., theoretical concepts are buried into ad hoc implementations that alone 
cannot qualify as a formalization of the theory.
Similarities  do  exist  between  Baars’  theory  involving  a  distributed  system  of 
parallel unconscious processors and our model of concurrent threads in a multi-agent 
system. First, our use of a blackboard for synchronizing messages is similar to Baars’ 
workspace for broadcasting conscious messages. Other analogies to be found include:
serial information broadcast v/s our blocking communication primitives 
goal hierarchies  v/s our  plan decision trees 
dominant goal  v/s our initial plan deduction
and (possibly)  process coalition v/s theory lifting.
This  last  point  is  a  mere  conjecture that  deserves  an explanation.  The concept of 
theory lifting was introduced by J. McCarthy in his attempt at formalizing contexts 
[12]. An executable account of this concept was given in [2]. We now suspect, and 
will try and formalize the hypothesis, that theory lifting can be used to model process 
coalition. As an example of a "Gedanken" experiment [8] that may be attempted, “a 
white square” should be recognized as “a sail” or “a hanging bed sheet” by lifting 
contextual knowledge associated with the surrounding landscape.
7   Conclusions
The explicit modeling of conscience threads, introduced in section 3, together with 
the possible reflection on one's own actions presented in section 4, opens the door to 
more complex consciousness models that should go beyond the simple monitoring of 
beliefs illustrated in this paper. 
From a technical point of view, it is interesting to note that the conscious operator 
was defined using a  call(r,ϕ)/return(s,ψ) pair  of communication primitives,  where 
ϕθ=ψθ  and lr ψθ , with lr  referring to the agent’s local state holding his beliefs. 
In contrast, the caught operator was defined using a ask(s,ψ)/tell(r,ϕ) pair involving a 
simplified ϕ ψθ  operation (because the agent’s local state cannot be of any use in 
this  case).  Somehow,  this  a  posteriori  justifies  the  choice  of  communication 
primitives we made in [3].
We are well aware of the formal inconsistencies that arise when trying to model 
self referential sentences using a single uniform language, as discovered by Montague 
[13].  To escape from these pitfalls,  we adopted a  constructivist point  of view i.e., 
similarly to nature itself, we grounded our concept of consciousness on successive, 
distinct operational layers, as summarized in the following pictures:
       
Neurons
                   
Hardware
Fig. 4.   Natural consciousness v/s simulated consciousness
            
Whereas inner layers interact with neighbors only (i.e., the virtual machine executes 
on the hardware, nd-plans are interpreted by this machine, dialogs are compiled into 
nd-plans, etc.), outer consciousness does rely on a direct access to a deeper underlying 
layer i.e., the virtual machine represented by the pseudo thread react. We are tempted 
to postulate that similar things happen in the working of natural consciousness.
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